By Ravindra Garimella
The recent enactment of the Sustainable Harnessing and Advancement Nuclear Energy for transforming India enactment 2025 by Parliament during the recently concluded Winter Session of Parliament in 2025, has brought to fore and generated interest vis-à-vis India’s Nuclear endeavors. This Bill as passed by both Houses of Parliament got Presidential assent on 20 December, 2025.
At this juncture, it would be of interest to revisit the roots of harassing atomic energy, its tremendous potential in the international scientific community.
Genesis – Albert Einstein
One instinctively turns to Albert Einstein, who laid the scientific foundations of atomic energy. Einstein’s pivotal contribution was theoretical rather than practical. In 1905, through his Special Theory of Relativity, he formulated E = mc², showing that mass and energy are interchangeable. This revealed that enormous energy could be released from a small amount of matter, forming the basis for modern nuclear energy—both civilian and military—though Einstein himself never applied it to weapons or reactors.
Einstein also played a crucial indirect role in energy development before World War II. In 1939, urged by physicists Leo Szilard and Eugene Wigner, he signed the Einstein-Szilard letter to President Franklin D. Roosevelt. The letter warned that Nazi Germany might develop atomic weapons and highlighted uranium’s military potential, urging the U.S. to accelerate nuclear research. While Einstein did not participate in the Manhattan Project, his action was politically decisive in mobilizing state support for nuclear research.
Despite his scientific stature, Einstein was not involved in the Manhattan Project. The reasons being Einstein’s pacifist views, left-leaning political associations, and concerns about security clearance, U.S. authorities did not permit him to work on classified nuclear weapons research. Consequently, Einstein had no role in the design, construction, or testing of atomic bombs. His contribution remained intellectual and advisory, rather than technical or operational.
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Eventually, the United States dropped atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Japan. On 6 August 1945, a uranium-based fission bomb, “Little Boy,” was dropped on Hiroshima. On 9 August, a plutonium-based fission bomb, “Fat Man,” struck Nagasaki. These remain the first and only use of nuclear weapons in warfare. The dates 6 and 9 August 1945 are etched as enduring, painful wounds in the world’s psyche. The destruction was ‘catastrophic’ beyond measure—so much so that even the word catastrophic is an understatement. Generations have borne the painful brunt and continue to do so.
Einstein was deeply shaken. Upon hearing of Hiroshima’s destruction, he reportedly exclaimed, “Woe is me.” He saw the bombings not as scientific achievement, but as a tragic misuse of knowledge. Later, he called signing the 1939 letter “the one great mistake” of his life, saying he would never have supported it had he known Germany would fail to develop the bomb.
In the post-war period, Einstein became a leading critic of nuclear weapons. A lifelong pacifist, he spent his remaining years campaigning for disarmament, arms control, and a world government to prevent future wars. He warned that humanity had entered a dangerous age where survival was threatened by its own inventions, emphasizing that scientific progress without ethical responsibility could lead to global catastrophe.
Role and later views of J. Robert Oppenheimer
J. Robert Oppenheimer played a central and direct role in the development of the atomic bomb and is widely regarded as the “Father of the Atomic Bomb.” As the Scientific Director of the Manhattan Project, he led the research and design of the world’s first nuclear weapons at Los Alamos Laboratory. Under his leadership, the project successfully produced the bombs known as “Little Boy” and “Fat Man,” which were later dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki.
The successful Trinity Test in July 1945 marked a turning point in Oppenheimer’s life. At that moment, he famously recalled a verse from the Bhagavad Gita: “Now I am become Death, the destroyer of worlds.” This quotation reflected his internal conflict-pride in scientific achievement combined with deep fear and moral unease about the destructive power that had been unleashed. While the project represented an extraordinary scientific triumph, its consequences weighed heavily on him.
After the war, Oppenheimer became an advocate for international control of nuclear weapons and a vocal opponent of the hydrogen bomb, which he believed would multiply destruction beyond all moral limits. His opposition brought him into conflict with U.S. political authorities during the Cold War. In 1954, amid suspicion and ideological pressure during the Red Scare, his security clearance was revoked, effectively ending his influence on American nuclear policy. Oppenheimer’s life came to symbolize the moral burden borne by scientists whose work can alter the fate of humanity.
Post World War II developments
The post world war witnessed a burgeoning race for acquisition of nuclear power. USA, Soviet Union, United Kingdom, France and China were the nuclear powers between 1950s to 1970s. Then came the Pokhran I (1974) experimental nuclear explosion, a proud moment for India, which took the world by surprise. Behind Pokhran was relentless scientific research, dedicated scientists under motivational leadership of Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru.
Institutional Foundations and Leadership (1954 onwards)
From 1954, India laid the institutional foundation of its nuclear program under the leadership of Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru, who emphasized peaceful uses of atomic energy while ensuring long-term strategic autonomy. The Department of Atomic Energy (DAE) was established directly under the Prime Minister’s Office, highlighting the strategic and sensitive nature of nuclear development. The Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) was entrusted with policy direction, and Dr. Homi Jehangir Bhabha, regarded as the architect of India’s nuclear program, was appointed to lead the initiative. This centralized structure ensured continuity, secrecy, and civilian control over nuclear research.
Development of Scientific and Research Infrastructure
India invested heavily in building indigenous scientific capacity to reduce dependence on foreign expertise. Institutions such as the Tata Institute of Fundamental Research (TIFR) became centers for theoretical nuclear physics, while the Bhabha Atomic Research Centre (BARC) (initially the Atomic Energy Establishment, Trombay) focused on applied nuclear research. These institutions trained Indian scientists in nuclear physics, reactor engineering, metallurgy, and radiochemistry, creating a strong domestic knowledge base necessary for advanced nuclear work.
Research Reactors and Plutonium Production Capability
A major step towards nuclear capability was the development of research reactors. India commissioned APSARA in 1956, its first research reactor, followed by the CIRUS reactor in 1960, built with Canadian assistance and U.S. supplied heavy water. Although officially meant for peaceful research, CIRUS produced plutonium, which later became the core material for the 1974 Pokhran test. In parallel, India developed spent fuel reprocessing facilities, enabling the extraction of plutonium-an essential technical requirement for a nuclear explosion.
Indigenous Nuclear Fuel Cycle and Self-Reliance
India pursued a policy of complete nuclear fuel-cycle self-reliance, covering uranium mining, fuel fabrication, reactor operation, and reprocessing. This approach was driven by the expectation of future technology denial regimes and international restrictions. By the late 1960s, India had achieved indigenous plutonium separation capability, marking a decisive milestone in its nuclear journey.
Strategic Environment and Nuclear Restraint
India’s nuclear thinking during this period was shaped by changing regional security dynamics, particularly China’s nuclear test in 1964, the 1962 Sino-Indian War, and conflicts with Pakistan in 1965 and 1971. Despite these pressures, India did not openly weaponize its nuclear programme. Instead, it adopted a policy of strategic restraint and nuclear ambiguity, keeping the nuclear option open while avoiding overt militarization.
Opposition to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (1968)
India strongly opposed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) of 1968, arguing that it created a discriminatory international order dividing the world into nuclear “haves” and “have-nots.” India refused to sign the treaty, thereby preserving its sovereign right to develop nuclear technology and preventing legal constraints on its nuclear options.
A bold Political Decision and Pokhran-I (1974)
By the early 1970s, India possessed trained nuclear scientists, reprocessing capability, plutonium stockpiles, and explosive design knowledge. Under Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, a political decision was taken to demonstrate India’s nuclear capability without declaring weaponization. This led to Pokhran-I on 18 May 1974, code-named “Smiling Buddha,” and officially described as a “Peaceful Nuclear Explosion (PNE).” The test marked the culmination of two decades of sustained scientific, institutional, and strategic effort, carried out under the banner of peaceful nuclear development while quietly achieving nuclear capability.
From 1954 to Pokhran-I (1974), India followed a deliberate, phased path to nuclear capability. By building strong institutions, investing in scientific infrastructure, developing reactors and reprocessing facilities, and achieving self-reliance in the nuclear fuel cycle, India laid the groundwork for a nuclear explosion. Simultaneously, it maintained strategic restraint, upheld nuclear ambiguity, promoted disarmament, and rejected discriminatory regimes like the NPT. Pokhran-I, labeled a “Peaceful Nuclear Explosion,” reflected two decades of careful scientific planning, political foresight, and strategic autonomy, balancing security with a commitment to peace.
Then came Pokhran-II during Atal Bihari Vajpayee’s tenure (1998)
Purpose
In May 1998, under Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee, India conducted five nuclear tests at Pokhran, known as Pokhran-II or Operation Shakti, ending decades of strategic ambiguity. Unlike 1974, these tests were openly acknowledged to declare India a nuclear weapons state and establish a credible minimum deterrent, driven by regional and global security concerns. Vajpayee stated, “India is now a nuclear weapons state,” and soon after, India adopted a “No First Use” nuclear doctrine, asserting strategic autonomy while advocating disarmament.
INDO-US Civil Nuclear deal
The signing of Civil Nuclear Agreement between India and United States stands out as a watershed event.
In July 2005: the then Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and President George W. Bush initiated civilian nuclear cooperation. On 1 August, 2008, IAEA approved India’s safeguards agreement. On 6 September, 2008, NSG waiver granted (first non-NPT nation to receive this). On 10 October, 2008, a Formal 123 Agreement signed
Strategic Outcome
This Ended 34 years of nuclear isolation. Further it preserved India’s three-stage nuclear programme autonomy (enrichment, reprocessing, thorium utilization remains government-controlled). It also granted access to civilian nuclear technology and uranium supplies from global vendors. Importantly, Maintained government monopoly on nuclear power generation through NPCIL.
Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage Act, 2010 (CLNDA)
The civil liability for Nuclear Damage Legislation was enacted in 2010 to create liability framework for US suppliers to operate in India.
The key provisions of this Act were:-
- Uniform Liability Cap: ₹500 crore (~$60 million USD)
- No-fault Strict Liability: Operator liable regardless of negligence
- Supplier Recourse (Section 17(b)): Controversial provision allowing operators to recover from suppliers for defects without explicit contracts.
In this Act, there came to force critical issue vide Section 17(b) of the Act.
This provision tend to be in violation of international norms (Vienna Convention limits recourse to written contracts).
Further, it also deterred foreign suppliers (Westinghouse, GE viewed liability as uninsurable).
This Act also maintained NPCIL monopoly in as much as private sector remained prohibited.
Since then much water has flown under the bridges. Several countries overtly or covertly acquired nuclear capability. Without going into further details in this regard, the fact of the day is that the threat of nuclear button being pushed/pressed by Leader of any dictatorial regime is in the relam of probability. Whenever there is war in any part of the world, the threat of nuclear option being taken recourse to is always there.
Under these circumstances, the enactment of the Sustainable Harnessing and Advancement Nuclear Energy for transforming India (SHANTI), by Parliament during Winter Session of 2025 is timely.
In this context, it would of interest to have a snapshot overview of SHANTI Act.
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SHANTI Bill, 2025 was introduced in Lok Sabha on 15 December, 2025, providing for repeal of Atomic Energy Act, 1962 and CLNDA, 2010.
Private Sector Participation – First Time
As per this provision to following will be eligible to obtain licenses:-
- Private companies (first time in independent India)
- Joint ventures between government and private
- Foreign and domestic entities
Such players are eligible for following activities.
- Build, own, operate nuclear reactors
- Nuclear fuel fabrication, enrichment (up to thresholds)
- Transportation and storage of fuel/spent fuel
Government
- Uranium enrichment and isotopic separation
- Spent fuel management and reprocessing
- Heavy water production
- Strategic facilities notified by Government
The strategic logic behind provisions of Private Sector participation is that three-stage program control is preserved; private firms manage power generation but cannot control strategic fuel cycle.
Under the provisions of Sections 11-16 of the Act provision had been made for liability framework – tired structure.
Operator Liability Cap (by Reactor Size):-
| Reactor Power | Cap |
| >3,600 MW | ₹3,000 crore |
| >1,500-3,600 MW | ₹1,500 crore |
| >750-1,500 MW | ₹750 crore |
| >150-750 MW | ₹300 crore |
| ≤150 MW | ₹100 crore |
The key changes from CLNDA, 2010 vis-à-vis SHANTI Act are:-
- Supplier Liability Removed: Operators’ recourse limited to written contracts only
- Government liable for excess damages (beyond operator cap, up to ₹3,000 crore total)
- Operators must secure insurance covering full liability cap before operations
Under the SHANTI Act, provision has also been made for Regulatory Framework.
- Statutory independent status (first time; previously administrative)
- Grants safety authorizations, inspects facilities, investigates incidents
- Can recommend license suspension/cancellation
Licensing Split:
- Central Government (DAE): Grants operational licenses
- AERB: Grants safety authorizations
Certain independence concerns which emerged from SHANTI Act are:-
- Government controls budget, staffing, directions (Clause 45)
- Final license cancellation authority: Central Government, not AERB
- Emergency takeover powers reserved to government (Clause 46)
A comparative statement in regard to CLNDA vs SHANTI Key Continuities and Changes:-
| Aspect | 2008-2010 | 2025 SHANTI | Change |
| Private Participation | Prohibited | Enabled | Shift (can of be concern) |
| Supplier Liability | Broad | Removed | Shift (can of be concern) |
| Liability Caps | ₹500 crore uniform | ₹100-3,000 tiered | Restructured, not inflation-adjusted (an issue) |
| Strategic Fuel Cycle | Government | Government | Preserved |
| Regulator | AERB administrative | AERB statutory | Formalized |
Some major challenges and governance issues as perceived in some quarters, think tanks are:-
As SHANTI has just been enacted only key areas have been flagged.
1. Liability Cap Inadequacy
The resultant impact would be:-
Catastrophic incidents leave victims undercompensated; government absorbs massive excess liability.
2. Removal of Supplier Liability Accountability Dilution
In erstwhile
- In erstwhile CLNDA 2010: Operators could recover from suppliers for defects broadly
- Under SHANTI 2025: Recovery only via written contracts
Consequence would be: Suppliers lose financial penalty for negligence; quality control incentives weakened. Aligns with international norms but trades safety accountability for investor attraction.
3. Fiscal Externalization – Private Profit, Public Risk
Mechanism:
- Private operator earns 40-60 year revenue
- Damages beyond operator’s cap borne by Central Government (taxpayers)
4. Spent Fuel Liability Asymmetry
- While Private operators generate spent fuel. The Central Government exclusively manages spent fuel (storage, reprocessing, waste).
- Act is silent on the Scenario: If incident occurs during government storage, who is liable?
As a result, Operators profit from generation; government bears indefinite waste management costs and liability.
5. Uranium Supply Constraints
Critical Issues:
- India’s uranium reserves: ~76,000 tons (exhausted in 7-10 years at 100 GW capacity
- Must import from Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Namibia, Australia
- No guarantee of uranium allocation to private operators
- Result: Government likely must guarantee supplies, reducing true “privatization”
6. Regulatory Independence Gaps
Despite Statutory Status:
- Government controls budget, staffing, directions
- Final license cancellation authority: Central Government, not AERB
- AERB regulating 40-60 private operators (vs. currently one NPCIL) may exceed capacity
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7. Further, there are Decommissioning Liability Gaps
- While Private operators can decommission reactors at end-of-life. Decommissioning costs: $1-2 billion USD (20-30% of plant lifecycle).
- SHANTI is silent on:-
- Minimum decommissioning fund requirements
- If funds insufficient, who covers overruns?
- If operator goes insolvent, who decommissions?
- Risk involved could be: Operator shuts down; site remains contaminated; government absorbs liability.
- It would be pertinent to take note why present shift of stance via SHANTI 2025
The Government’s Strategic Rationale’s:-
- 100 GW target by 2047 unachievable at NPCIL’s ~1 GW/year pace
- Private entry requires removing supplier liability deterrent (CLNDA Section 17(b))
- Westinghouse, Framatome, Rosatom awaiting clear legal framework
- Apprehensions are it could be a trade off which is Sacrifice some accountability for accelerated capacity and technology access.
Conclusion: Strategic Necessity with Unresolved Risks
SHANTI 2025 Historic Achievement:
- ✓Aligns with international norms (Vienna Convention CSC)
- ✓Establishes independent regulator (AERB statutory)
Critical Gaps:
- ✗Liability caps inadequate and unadjusted for inflation
- ✗Accountability diluted (supplier liability removed)
- ✗Fiscal exposure (government absorbs excess damages)
- ✗Regulatory subordination despite statutory status
- ✗Spent fuel liability unclear
- ✗Uranium allocation mechanism undefined
- ✗ushed passage without consultation
Summarization: SHANTI operationalizes the 2008 civil nuclear deal by finally enabling private entry, but does so with shortcuts. Success depends on subordinate rules addressing gaps, AERB’s actual independence, private operator discipline, and government maintaining adequate liability fund reserves. Farther had SHANTI been enacted after scrutiny by a parliamentary committee, that would have been more appropriate.
Nuclear energy needless state has phenomenal potential for humankind’s welfare, developmental in multiple disciplines. Having said that nuclear power hangs over mankind as a Damocles sword in this strife form world scenario.