When Washington began asking hard questions about G42, Abu Dhabi’s leading artificial-intelligence company, its chief executive explained why the firm was cutting its ties with Chinese suppliers. “We cannot work with both sides,” Peng Xiao told the Financial Times. G42 sold its investments in China and began pulling Chinese hardware out of its systems. In April 2024, after an arrangement worked out with the American government, Microsoft invested $1.5 billion in the company. Hold that sentence in mind. It was spoken by one of the most accomplished hedgers on earth. The Gulf sells crude to China, buys its security from the United States, and invests in both. At the layer of chips and clouds, its flagship technology company found that the menu had two items.

Carry that sentence into the week just ended, split between Manila and Shenzhen. In Manila, more than twenty heads of state and government gathered for the forty-ninth ASEAN Summit, the twenty-first East Asia Summit, and a revived meeting of the Quad. In Shenzhen, Donald Trump, Xi Jinping, and Vladimir Putin met on the margins of the thirty-third APEC meeting. A veteran Indian diplomat writing from New Delhi’s orbit has offered the most considered reading of that week. It deserves to be read the way a coastal pilot reads a tide table: not for its poetry, but for the exact tolerances within which a heavy vessel can maneuver without scraping its hull. A “G3” of the United States, China, and Russia, he argues, “can’t write rules, even if it wants to.” “Shenzhen is no Yalta.” Manila stands for multipolarity; Shenzhen for a “triadic geopolitical endeavour.” From the giants’ stalemate he draws a conclusion: regional states are “increasingly writing their own rules,” with India, through Narendra Modi’s embrace of both ASEAN centrality and Quad deterrence, as a credible and autonomous pivot.
The first half of that argument is right, and more right than the column lets on. Washington arrives bruised by midterm setbacks, facing a hostile Congress by January 2027, unable to settle Ukraine without Kyiv and the European Union at the table. Beijing will not place its growing nuclear arsenal under any arms-control regime and remains locked in a technology war after the Nvidia affair. Moscow can neither force Ukraine to capitulate nor afford to yield. Underneath each of these sits something deeper than lack of leverage: domestic survival. Xi presides over property deflation, local-government debt, and stubborn youth unemployment; he cannot dismantle state industrial support without straining the Party’s social compact. Putin runs a war economy so bent around military spending that sudden peace would be almost as dangerous as continued attrition. Trump governs an electorate weary of foreign wars and attached to cheap goods. None of the three can survive the concessions a real bargain would demand. Yalta divided the spoils among allies who had won a war together. Shenzhen gathered rivals who have won nothing from one another—which is why Chinese commentators and both Beijing and Moscow publicly brushed aside the “Yalta 2.0” label even as foreign observers reached for it. Three embattled domestic managers met in a mirrored room, each hoping the cameras would persuade his own public that he was still master of the house.
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It is the second half that fails. From the giants’ inability to write rules, it does not follow that the middle powers can. The column assumes that a world in which no great power can dictate is a world in which the courted can set terms. The opposite is closer to the truth, and the reason is a matter of price.
During the Cold War, from Bandung in 1955 onward, non-alignment had scarcity value. A pivotal capital could extract steel mills, grain shipments, or security guarantees because two blocs competed to lock in its loyalty, and loyalty, once given, was hard to take back. Today most governments in the Indo-Pacific announce that they are open to all suitors and bound to none. That is a sensible policy for any one state. Adopted by most of them at once, it floods the market. When the majority of middle powers court both Washington and Beijing, they stop being scarce partners and become commodities. Intense rivalry between the two buyers does not automatically raise the price, because the supply of hedging capitals is large and elastic. Each great power knows the seller will entertain the next offer; the competition therefore stays issue-by-issue rather than becoming a bidding war for exclusive alignment. Why pay for a binding defense guarantee or deep, asymmetric market access when neutrality can be leased—a port concession here, a critical-minerals memorandum there, a flattering toast at a summit dinner? Universal hedging has not given the Global South the pen. It has created a buyer’s market for hegemons.
Two apparent exceptions do not overturn the pattern. Indonesia’s nickel export ban forced processing onshore and extracted real industrial concessions; that is a middle power setting terms in a sector where it holds scarce feedstock. The Philippines under Marcos has visibly tightened security ties with the United States. Both cases matter. They also remain the exceptions that prove the larger rule: most regional states continue to treat alignment as a portfolio rather than a commitment, and the great powers price them accordingly.
The column’s own celebration of India shows the strain. One cannot champion ASEAN’s studied neutrality and, in the same breath, boast of reinforcing “Quad deterrence against unilateralism.” Deterrence is a currency backed by a visible willingness to share risk in a crisis; multi-alignment is the explicit reservation of the right to stay home. Without binding commitments, the Quad is a valuable clearinghouse for maritime awareness, not a shield that stays a hegemon’s hand. And a pivot must be heavy enough for others to turn on. By the government’s own think tank, NITI Aayog, India’s share of global manufacturing value rose from about 1.5 percent in 1995 to only 3.2 percent in 2023, while China’s climbed to nearly 32 percent. A country that makes a tenth of what its rival makes can be courted; it cannot yet set terms. ASEAN’s defenders, Kishore Mahbubani foremost among them, answer that the region’s diplomacy should be judged by the wars that did not happen. That is a real achievement. But a peace kept is not a rule written. Avoiding rupture is precisely what a buyer’s market permits; it costs the buyers nothing.
Nor is there anyone to enforce whatever rules the region writes. The World Trade Organization’s Appellate Body has been unable to hear appeals since 2019. Beijing brushed aside the South China Sea arbitral award. The Indo-Pacific economic frameworks of recent years offered no enforceable market access. A rule without a referee is a wish written on expensive stationery. Governance has drifted from law toward continuous bilateral friction management, in which compliance depends on naval escorts, local balances of power, and the war-risk premium quoted for a vessel crossing a contested strait.
What the region is actually doing, while it speaks of rules, is laying pipes. The pipes are where the choices are being made. Start with goods. The column speaks of ASEAN’s quest for “supply-chain resilience” against Chinese “chokeholds,” as though Vietnam, Malaysia, and Indonesia offered an alternative industrial system. In many sectors they do not. Follow a solar module or an electric-vehicle battery pack across the South China Sea: polysilicon, processed rare-earth magnets, cathode precursors, and machine tools come from Chinese industrial clusters; they arrive at a newly incorporated subsidiary in Penang or Bac Ninh, often financed by mainland capital and staffed by Chinese engineers; there they are assembled and certified with a Southeast Asian origin before sailing for Los Angeles or Rotterdam. Much of the “China+1” migration has been less an exodus from Chinese industry than its geographical extension. In July 2025, announcing a trade deal with Vietnam, Trump set a 20 percent tariff on Vietnamese goods and 40 percent on goods deemed transshipped through the country. A tariff polices the label, not the balance sheet. It can punish crude origin-washing; it cannot touch a Chinese-owned factory that legally does enough work in Bac Ninh to earn its Vietnamese certificate. The resilience celebrated in Manila is real in the customs ledger and much thinner in the ownership register.
Then follow the money. Russia could not sit at the table in Shenzhen as a functioning war economy had it not moved much of its trade onto rails that bypass Western correspondent banks, settling in yuan and, with India, in rupees. Across ASEAN, central banks have been building frameworks for settling trade in their own currencies. None of this is a declaration of war on the dollar. It works like water finding a crack in concrete: incremental, technical, reversible in good weather, and decisive in a storm. The same logic that cheapens political alignment also cheapens financial dependence. When the dominant buyer’s own balance sheet is under strain—compounding federal debt service, finite appetite for Treasury issuance, the simultaneous financing of distant theaters and a domestic industrial subsidy race—the price it is willing to pay for loyalty falls further. The buyer’s market is not only a function of too many sellers; it is also a function of a constrained buyer.
Goods and money still allow a state to hedge; a factory can serve two markets and a central bank can hold two currencies. The third layer does not. Subsea cables, satellite constellations, sovereign cloud mandates, and rival standards for artificial intelligence are dividing the region into technical systems that do not interconnect. Henry Farrell and Abraham Newman have shown how whoever controls such networks can turn them into instruments of coercion. Once a country’s telecommunications backbone, payment switches, and data centers are wired into one stack, its multi-alignment becomes largely theatrical, held in place not by treaties but by software updates, spare parts, and cryptographic keys. This is the layer at which G42 discovered it could not work with both sides. The column counts the Strait of Hormuz as a drain on American strength; yet in January 2025 Abu Dhabi’s MGX, an investment vehicle backed by the sovereign fund Mubadala and by G42 itself, joined OpenAI, SoftBank, and Oracle as an equity partner in the Stargate data-center venture Trump unveiled at the White House. Money from the shores of Hormuz is helping to build America’s AI. The Gulf kept its options open on oil and on capital. On compute, it chose.
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That is the decision now arriving in Manila. It will not be announced in a communiqué. It will be made in tenders for cable landings, cloud contracts, and telecommunications networks—each technical on its own, together an alignment.
What, then, is left for the middle powers, and for India above all? Not a blueprint, but a dilemma the column’s optimism leaves out. A seller regains its price in only two ways: by offering something the buyer cannot get elsewhere, or by refusing to sell alone. The first requires the industrial depth India does not yet have. The second requires middle powers to bargain together, to set a floor beneath which none of them will lease its neutrality. Both paths demand commitment—to a long industrial build-out or to one’s neighbors—and commitment is precisely what multi-alignment forswears. The strategy that protects each middle power individually is the one that cheapens them all collectively. That is the real fault line beneath the week’s summits, and it runs through New Delhi as much as through Jakarta or Manila.
None of this makes the diplomat’s column foolish. A capital without illusions is a capital without a compass, and the duty of a strategist inside the state is to articulate the most constructive version of national agency that reality will bear. But the duty of the reader is to test the claim against the evidence. The giants cannot write the rules; on that the column is right. The middle powers are not writing them either. The rules that will bind the Indo-Pacific are being written in a different medium—in cable routes, settlement rails, and server contracts—and the states that sign them mostly do not yet regard them as rules at all.


